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Creating inclusive communities: 
The results of resettlement in Zimbabwe   
 
Zimbabwe’s land reform and resettlement 
programme in the early 1980s resulted in the 
formation of highly inclusive communities 
where the poor were not excluded from any of 
the groups set up to address communal prob-
lems. This is the conclusion of a study of nine-
teen of the villages that were established in 
the programme. While men and women tend-
ed to separate into single-sex groups, this was 
not due to a lack of trust between the sexes, 
and female-headed households were not ex-
cluded from community-based organizations 
(CBOs) either. Family, clan and religion all 
played an important role in bringing together 
neighbours who did not know each other prior 
to resettlement and these social ties provided 
the basis for the trust that has been essential 
for them to act collectively. It remains to be 
seen whether the current land reforms and re-
settlement programmes will be as successful. 
 
Implications for practitioners 
These findings will come as good news to 
development practitioners who, as supporters 
of community-based development initiatives, 
engage existing CBOs or encourage people to 
form new groups and organizations to take 
part in interventions. However, it should be 
recognized that this study focused on a par-
ticular type of village. Unlike most rural Zim-
babwean and other African communities, 
these resettlement villages are not made up of 
kinsmen but of people who generally knew 
few, if any, of their new neighbours before they 
were resettled. In many ways, they reflect 
refugee settlements in their organization. 
That the tendency for men and women to 
separate into single-sex groups is not the re-
sult of a lack of trust between the sexes will be 
of particular interest to practitioners in the Afri-
can microfinance sector. It would also appear 
that religious beliefs create trust between the 
sexes and provide a foundation for holding 
each other to account. 
 
Research project design  
This Infosheet presents the results of a col-
laborative research project entitled ‘An Experi-
mental Analysis of Network and Group Forma-
tion for Collective Action’ that was developed 
by the Centre for the Study of African Econo-
mies (CSAE) at the University of Oxford and 
the African Study Centre (ASC) in the Neth-
erlands. The project used data from a social 
experiment and a lab-type field experiment to 
investigate group formation for collective ac-
tion in nineteen resettled Zimbabwean villages 
that are part of the Zimbabwe Rural House-
hold Dynamics Study (ZRHDS).  
 
 
 
A group of men singing at the closing of one of 
the research activities in their village 
 
 
The social experiment came about as a re-
sult of the Zimbabwean government voluntarily 
resettling people in new villages made up of 
unrelated and often unacquainted households 
in the early 1980s. To survive and prosper, the 
villagers had to solve their problems through 
collective action and, with varying degrees of 
success, the villages in the study did this by 
forming CBOs. 
The lab-type field experiment involved a 
‘group-formation’ game that mimicked situa-
tions in which development agencies, non-
governmental organizations or government 
bodies invited villagers to form groups to ad-
dress a shared problem or to take advantage 
of mutually beneficial opportunities. This 
‘game’ was played out in 2001, some twenty 
years after resettlement had taken place, in 
resettled villages established in the early 
1980s and in a few non-resettled villages 
located nearby and from where some of those 
who resettled had originally come. 
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Male participant in the field experiment 
 
 
The study analyzed data on the composi-
tion of the groups formed within the field ex-
periment and the CBOs set up in the new vil-
lages in the 1980s that were still in existence 
two decades later. Information on village geog-
raphies (the distance between households), 
kinship networks (lineage, kinship and mar-
riage ties) and household characteristics (the 
age, education and sex of the household head 
and wealth status) were used to investigate 
the reasons why certain groups had been 
formed.  
 
 
 
A group meeting to collect information on 
village kinship networks 
 
 
The study villages and the resettled house-
holds were followed over two decades. More 
recent information was available for a sub-
sample of the households that incorporated 
the effects of the harsh political and economic 
environment in the 2000s. The villages are 
part of two resettlement schemes and com-
munal areas adjacent to the schemes (see 
Map).  
 
 
Map of Zimbabwe showing the research 
locations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The findings in more detail 
The poor are not excluded. Analysis revealed 
no evidence of the poor being excluded or 
choosing to exclude themselves from village 
groups, or of the rich grouping with the rich 
and the poor with the poor. Indeed, the vil-
lages in which average wealth was lowest at 
the time of resettlement had better networks of 
CBO co-membership throughout the subse-
quent two decades. In these villages it was the 
wealthier households that were instrumental in 
setting up the CBOs, possibly because land 
clearance and homestead-building was easier 
and faster for them. Initially, the poorer house-
holds would have had little time for anything 
but land clearance and building but by 1985 
they appear to have been just as engaged as 
the wealthier households. The finding that 
CBO co-membership networks were denser in 
poorer villages could indicate that there was a 
greater need in such villages for collective ac-
tion. 
 
Place and time matter. In the early years of 
resettlement, CBO membership was more like-
ly between households that were geographi-
cally close, i.e. neighbours as compared to co-
villagers living half to one km apart. Given the 
time constraints mentioned before, it may have 
been easier for them to connect and collabo-
rate with people who lived close at hand. Peo-
ple who arrived five to ten years later tended 
to either be excluded from or to choose not to 
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join existing CBOs in the village and to set up 
new ones with other later settlers instead.  
 
Women and men tend to separate into single-
sex groups but this was not due to a lack of 
trust. It will come as no surprise to anyone 
who has convened meetings in Sub-Saharan 
Africa that when women and men were invited 
to form groups during the field experiment, 
they tended to separate into male and female 
groupings. However, this was not because wo-
men find it easier to trust other women and 
men other men. In fact, when trust was impor-
tant, there was less separation of the sexes. 
Further analysis indicated that trust is stronger 
within families and among people who belong 
to the same religious group, and family or reli-
gious ties are not organized along gender 
lines. Although female-headed households are 
marginally less likely to connect via a CBO 
network, they were not excluded and did not 
choose to exclude themselves from associat-
ing with male-headed households  
 
 
 
Female participants during one of the research 
activities 
 
 
Religions and families support the informal en-
forcement of collective agreements. As well as 
supporting the formation of mixed-sex groups 
when mutual trust is important, families and 
religious organizations provide a context in 
which people hold each other to account. 
Those who attend the same church or are 
connected through kinship or marriage ties 
(such as brothers, fathers-in-law, uncles and 
nieces) were more likely to form groups during 
the game in the field experiment.  
 
Relationships formed by belonging to the 
same CBO are valued. Co-members of CBOs 
were more likely to group together when in-
vited to do so during the field experiment ex-
cept when the agreements holding those 
groups together could be socially enforced. At 
first glance, this finding appears odd. How-
ever, it is consistent with CBO members want-
ing to protect their on-going valuable relation-
ships from harm that could be done to them if 
one or other party was tempted to pull out of 
the agreement. When the grouping agree-
ments were enforced by the organizers, there 
was no such risk. When they were supported 
by trust alone, they could be broken but no 
one would ever know. On-going relations 
would be unharmed. To make informal social 
enforcement possible, the game was set up so 
that people who wanted to pull out of their 
grouping agreements had to tell everyone 
what they were doing. So a renegade could 
upset on-going relationships and this repre-
sented a risk. Not grouping was the easiest 
way to avoid this risk. That CBO co-members 
did not group together in the last method is an 
indication of the value they placed on co-
membership. 
 
Future research 
These findings are based on data collected 
over two decades in resettlement schemes 
that were established in the early 1980s. It 
remains to be seen whether the current land 
reform and resettlement programmes, which 
started in the late 1990s and early 2000s, will 
do as well. In addition, while population move-
ments, cash constraints and other deteriora-
tions in economic conditions in the 2000s 
probably increased the very need for collective 
action, many CBOs and other networks were 
badly affected by these same events. Prelimi-
nary results from recent work in a sub-sample 
of six villages showed that almost 75% of the 
non-religious CBOs from the study’s 2000 data 
were no longer operating in 2008. Only time 
will tell if the structures established over two 
decades will be revitalized when the economy 
picks up again.  
 
 
 
 
Women from the Chitenderano Club preparing 
groundnuts for processing 
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